Arthur Schlesinger's Imperial Presidency

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1973) 0-395-17713-8

Some may doubt the need, or use, to review a book about the powers and duties of U.S, presidents published 52 years ago in 1973. But wait! Allow me to quote from page 418 of this 419 page book. “If the Nixon White House escaped the consequences of its illegal behavior, why would future Presidents and their associates not suppose themselves entitled to do what the Nixon White House had done? . . . We have noted that corruption appears to visit the White House in fifty-year cycles. This suggests that exposure and retribution inoculate the Presidency against its latent criminal impulses for about half a century. Around the year 2023 the American people would be well advised to go on alert and start nailing down everything in sight.”

Arthur Schlesinger passed away in 2007 but not his relevance to Trump. The book has eleven chapters that start with two chapters outlining the 1787 constitutional debate defining the executive power of the president. Narrative for the next five chapters follow a historical chronology of events almost entirely confined to the war making and foreign policy powers in the presidential office. The last three chapters discuss democracy in relation to foreign policy, the uses and abuses of presidential secrecy and a discussion of the future of the presidential office.

The founding fathers did not want the president to have the sole power to declare war. After long debate they adopted the Alexander Hamilton proposals that the Senate will have the sole power of declaring war and the executive will direct the war authorized by Congress. There would be a separation of power: Congress would declare war, the President would be commander and chief. The 1787 debate assures no one considered the president’s role as commander in chief as a source of independent authority.

From the beginning the separation of power generated a history of struggles with the President asserting authority to make foreign policy decisions without consulting Congress, or in direct opposition by it. Except for making treaties and nominating ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate, Schlesinger explains the Constitution has nothing else to say about foreign affairs and diplomacy. Nothing written guides recognizing foreign governments, declaring neutrality in international disputes, the status of executive agreements or the gathering or sharing of foreign intelligence.  No sections clarify authority in military emergencies. Many of the contested decisions involve military deployment in disputes that fill chapters 3 through 7 where Schlesinger narrates the Constitutional disputes between Congress and the many Presidents from colonial times to Richard Nixon.

The presidents often got their way in foreign policy by easily exploiting a divided Congress such as John Tyler and James K. Polk with Mexico and Abraham Lincoln with the Civil War. While the Constitution provides Congress with separate powers to restrain a defiant president, these powers tend to be hard to use such as impeachment, veto of a treaty, or refusal to vote funds; consensus can be hard to assemble. Schlesinger narrates many of these episodes like the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and the battle over Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations after WWI. Separate chapters narrate disputes between Congress and Franklin Roosevelts in WWII, between Congress and President Truman in the Korean War, and between Congress and Presidents Johnson and Nixon in the Vietnam War.

After this thorough historical review, the narrative reaches Chapter 8 where Schlesinger characterizes the Imperial Presidency and then applies these characteristics to Richard Nixon.  He argues Nixon ignored his cabinet and brought an unprecedented exclusion of Congress, the Press, and public opinion from governmental decision making and concentrated power in the White House. Nixon asserted absolute authority over the Vietnam War and foreign policy and then expanded the imperial presidency to take over domestic policy as well.

Schlesinger lived through the Nixon era as an active and informed historian and journalist. In the Imperial Presidency he characterized Nixon as a man with “revolutionary dreams,” a “sense of life as a battlefield” and a president “whose inner mix of vulnerability and ambition impelled him to push the historical logic to its extremity.”

In domestic policy, Nixon, like Trump after him, proposed corporate tax relief, made offers of subsidies, threats of tariffs, and various lucrative deals to reward the politically compliant and punish the unregenerate. Nixon, like Trump after him, used the executive order to alter legislation, or change the authority of boards or agencies to suit his purpose. Nixon expected to shape policy by impounding funds for Congressionally approved projects he did not like. In July 1969 his Administration released a statement they would not enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. He appointed an Office of Economic Opportunity director to dismantle the agency that Congress had voted to continue.

Nixon asserted power to revoke legislation such as the Family Practice of Medicine Act passed Congress by overwhelming veto proof majorities December 14, 1970. He declined to return the bill to Congress with his veto within the required 10 days but instead waited eight days and declared a five day holiday recess gave him authority to defeat the bill with a pocket veto. Republican Senator Jacob Javits declared the bill “illegally vetoed” and commented “If the pocket veto clause applies to a five-day adjournment, why should it not also apply to an adjournment of three days, or a weekend, or one day, or overnight.”

Nixon expanded executive privilege to new levels, often rejecting formal requests for documents or requests for administration officials to testify before Congress. He made unprecedented use of executive privilege to thwart investigation into his Watergate misconduct and expected to keep secrets from Congress and the country like bombing South East Asia during and after the Vietnam War.

Chapter 8 ends the narrative as historical chronology. By Chapter 9 readers have studied dozens of examples of presidents doing as they please and Congress unable to use their power to stop him. In the last three chapters Schlesinger wants to know “how a government based on the principle of the separation of powers could be made to work.” These chapters are topical rather than chronological but there are no answers, only more examples of the failure of the separation of powers to hold a president accountable.

Schlesinger’s Imperial Presidency gives readers little reason to believe our Constitution and the separation of powers can maintain democracy. In 1973 Schlesinger thought the Vietnam War proved our Constitution was obsolete and left presidents to exercise unchecked power. By the end of the book Schlesinger doubted the Constitution would be adequate to limit presidential misconduct “if the people themselves had come to an unconscious acceptance of the imperial presidency.” The country survived Nixon, but in 2025 the Nixon connection to Trump should be easy to feel. I find nothing that assures the country will survive Trump. After reading his book I feel certain Arthur Schlesinger would agree.